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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly construe its March 22, 2006 order from a 
prior case involving the same parties to find that the same claims raised in this 
subsequent case were res judicata? The standard of review is correctness. Maoris 
& Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. 
2. Did the trial court correctly dismiss appellants5 complaint herein as 
barred by res judicata? The standard of review is correctness. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is an appeal of the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of 
Appellants' complaint in this action, "the Second Action." Appellants filed the 
Second Action after failing to timely file an appeal in a prior action, "the First 
Action. The trial court dismissed the Second Action as res judicata from the final 
disposition of the same claims in the First Action. Appellees accept Appellants' 
statement of the case, so far as its goes. However, Appellees offer herewith a 
more detailed procedural history of relevant proceedings. 
First Action 
2. Appellants filed their "Verified Complaint for Preliminary 
Injunction" against San Juan County ("the County") and Red Rock 4-Wheelers, 
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Inc. ("RR4W") on March 31, 2004. Appellants' complaint requested the trial 
court to prevent 2004 Jeep Safari participants from using a road called the Strike 
Ravine Trail where it passes over real property in San Juan County Appellants are 
purchasing from the Utah School and Institutional Trust Administration 
("SITLA"). R. 41, 52-78. The trial court denied Appellants'request for a 
preliminary injunction at hearing on April 2, 2004. R. 42. The court's ruling was 
formalized by written order entered April 19, 2004.l Id. 
3. On May 17, 2004 Appellants filed an Amended Complaint in the 
First Action. R. 42, 79-71. The Amended Complaint's first cause of action 
requested the trial court to quiet title to what was called "the Lower Helldorado 
Trail," a route not involved in the official Jeep Safari. The second and third 
causes of action requested the trial court to quiet title to the Strike Ravine Trail. 
4. On or about May 28, 2004 and June 17, 2004 San Juan County and 
Red Rock 4-Wheelers respectively filed similar answers and counterclaims. R. 42-
43, 92-100, 101-110. The counterclaims' first causes of action asked the trial 
court to quiet title to the Strike Ravine Trail by finding that San Juan County and 
RR4W held temporary public easements pursuant to Utah Code § 72-5-203(1), and 
1
 Copies of written rulings and orders from the First Action are included in the 
Addendum. 
2
 This claim was subsequently dismissed pursuant to stipulation on June 19, 2006. 
R. 266-67. 
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related provisions over the real property allegedly owned or held by Appellants. 
The counterclaims' second causes of action requested injunctive relief to prevent 
Appellants from interfering with Appellees' uses of the Strike Ravine Trail. The 
counterclaims' third cause of action requested the trial court to declare the Strike 
Ravine Trail a public thoroughfare under Utah Code § 72-5-104. 
5. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment 
regarding the Strike Ravine Trail. R. 43-44. The trial court denied Appellants' 
motion for partial summary judgment and granted Appellees' motions for partial 
summary judgment by its Order dated March 3, 2005. R. 44-45, R. 111-114. The 
trial court ruled that San Juan County, RR4W and the public had temporary public 
easements or rights-of-way to use the Strike Ravine Trail pursuant to the "Rights 
of Way Across State Lands Act," Utah Code § 72-5-201, et seq., stating: 
2. Defendants1 motions for partial summary judgment are 
granted as follows: 
A. Uncontradicted evidence having been presented 
that the Strike Ravine trail had been constructed and maintained, or 
used by a responsible authority and existed prior to January 1, 1992, 
the Court determines that San Juan holds for the public, and Red 
Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc., holds for its own uses pursuant to Section 72-
5-201, Utah Code, a temporary public easement or right-of-way to 
use the Strike Ravine trail. All members of the public have the right 
to travel the Strike Ravine trail. This temporary public easement was 
not extinguished when the State of Utah sold the land across which 
the Strike Ravine trail passes to the plaintiffs. The purpose a 
member of the public has in traveling the Strike Ravine trail is 
irrelevant. 
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B. The temporary easement exists until a 
permanent easement is established under Section 72-5-203(2), Utah 
Code. The parties conceded the fair market value for a permanent 
easement must be paid. Because the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration ("SITLA") is not a party to this case, the court 
cannot determine at this time whether compensation for the easement 
should be paid to SITLA or plaintiffs. The court also cannot 
determine whether SITLA or plaintiffs have standing to dispute the 
value placed on the permanent easement or make the determination 
referred to in Section 72-5-203(c), Utah Code. 
C. This court does not believe that defendants can 
postpone indefinitely petitioning for establishment of the permanent 
easement. The Court encourages the parties, in cooperation with 
SITLA, to agree upon a timetable for establishing the permanent 
easement and determining the fair value thereof. In the absence of 
agreement, the court will intervene to set deadlines and mechanisms 
for resolving this matter at the invitation of any party. 
R. 112-13. 
6. Thereafter, although the case was not final, Appellants filed their 
first notice of appeal on April 7, 2005. R. 45; Court of Appeals appeal no. 
20050369-CA. This appeal would be summarily dismissed by this Court, with the 
remitter filed with the trial court on August 1, 2005. R. 46. 
7. The trial court's ruling at paragraph C. stated, "This court does not 
believe that defendants can postpone indefinitely petitioning for establishment of 
the permanent easement." R. 113. However, SITLA advised the parties that it 
took the position that it could not grant a permanent easement after SITLA had 
issued a certificate of sale. Thus advised, RR4W on or about July 29, 2005 RR4W 
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moved to join the State Institutional and Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") to 
the action and for leave to file a third-party complaint against SITLA and to file a 
supplemental counterclaim against Appellants. R. 46, 115-126. RR4W stated, 
inter alia, in its memorandum: 
7. RR4W has rights under Section 72-5-201 and Section 72-5-
203(2), UCA and other portions of the Rights-of-Way Across State 
Lands Act, Section 72-5-201, et seq. (f,the Statute"). RR4W also has 
rights under the Order. Among these rights are the Temporary 
Easement and RR4Wfs right to obtain the Permanent Easement by 
payment of the value of the Permanent Easement. 
8. RR4W intends pay for and, thereby, acquire the Permanent 
Easement. However, the Court and RR4W have not been able to 
determine whether the party/parties entitled to payment is/are SITLA 
or Plaintiffs. Therefore, assuming the instant motion is granted, 
RR4W intends to interplead the payment ("the Payment") into the 
Court and let the Court determine whether SITLA or Plaintiffs is/are 
entitled to the Payment. 
9. RR4W requires that the Court intervene to grant relief to 
which it is entitled, including obtaining the Permanent Easement. 
RR4W reserves all rights under its earlier counterclaim against 
Plaintiffs. 
R. 119. 
8. On August 5, 2005, San Juan County filed its motion for leave to 
join SITLA as a third-party defendant and for leave to file its proposed 
supplemental counterclaims against Appellants and third-party complaint against 
SITLA. R. 46. 
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9. On August 15, 2005, the trial court held a scheduling conference. 
The parties stipulated to joining SITLA and to the filing of Appellees' third-party 
complaint and supplemental counterclaims. The trial court authorized RR4W and 
San Juan County to file their third-party complaints and supplemental 
counterclaims and set oral arguments for January 24, 2006, anticipating that 
SITLA would be served and the issues briefed by such time. R. 46-47. 
10. On August 22, 2005 the trial court signed and entered the order 
joining SITLA as a party and granting Appellees leave to file their supplemental 
counterclaims and third party complaints. R. 47. On August 23, 2005, RR4W 
filed its supplemental counterclaim and third party complaint. R. 47, 127-138. On 
September 1, 2005 San Juan County filed its supplemental counterclaim and third-
party complaint. R. 47,139-152. On or about August 23, 2005 RR4W tendered 
$825 to the Clerk as payment for a permanent easement with the payee to be 
determined under RR4W's supplemental counterclaim and third-party complaint. 
R.47. 
11. SITLA accepted service (R. 47), and, on October 7, 2005 SITLA 
served on all parties State of Utah's Rule 54(b) Motion to Modify March 3, 2005 
Order and Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Complaints of Red Rock 
4-Wheelers, Inc. and San Juan County. R. 47-48, 148-151. Under the heading 
"Relief Requested" at page 2 SITLA's motion stated, "The Trust Lands 
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Administration requests ... modification of this Court's order of March 3, 2005 in 
this matter." R. 149. 
12. With its motion SITLA filed a supporting memorandum dated 
October 7, 2005. R. 152-177. Point II of SITLA's memorandum was headed: 
"The Court's March 3, 2005 Order Should Be Modified to Reflect SITLAs Sale of 
the Subject Property and the Inability of Either SITLA or Buyers to Issue an 
Easement under the Right-of-Way Act." R. 159. Contrary to the Court's position, 
SITLA contended that it could not issue a permanent easement after it had issued a 
certificate of sale to Appellants. In Point II SITLA offered, as one alternative 
option for amendment of the trial court's March 3, 2005 Order, for the trial court to 
"find that the 'temporary' easement encumbered the property as an existing right, 
and that the same continues to exist indefinitely so long as the property does not 
revert to the State."3 R. 162. 
3
 SITLA moved the trial court to find either (1) that "the County was placed on 
notice that the subject property was to be sold, and did not object or seek any 
permanent easement before the sale," or, (2) "that the certificate of sale was 
expressly subject to Defendants' temporary easements." R. 162. The trial court 
had already rejected SITLA's proposed alternative (1), finding inadequate due 
process notice to Appellees at the temporary injunction hearing on April 2, 2004 
(R. 213-215) and in its denial of Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment 
and granting of Appellees' motions for partial summary judgment. Alternative (2) 
was the trial court's law of the case, and was a basis for the March 3, 2005 Order. 
No due process notice of intent to extinguish temporary easement rights was 
included in SITLA's general notice of intent to sell the property. SITLA's sale to 
Appellants preceded, and its due process defects were the impetus for (R. 204), 
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13. On November 4, 2005 Appellees filed their joint motion and 
memorandum "... To Stay Defendants' Response to SITLA 's Motion to Dismiss 
Third Party Complaint and Joint Motion to Modify Order. " R. 48, 178-187. In 
their motion and memorandum, Appellees accepted SITLAfs offer to amend the 
March 3, 2005 Order to "find that the 'temporary' easement encumbered the 
property as an existing right, and that the same continues to exist indefinitely so 
long as the property does not revert to the State." R. 162, 183-84. Appellees 
moved the trial court to modify the March 3 Order expressly as set forth in their 
memorandum. Part of the joint motion's effect, if granted, would be to dismiss 
SITLA as a third-party defendant. R. 186. 
14. On November 25, 2005 Appellants filed Plaintiffs9 Joinder in the 
State's Rule 54(b) Motion to Modify March 3, 2005 Order and Rule 12(b) Motion 
to Dismiss the Third Party Complaints ("Appellants1 Joinder"). R. 48, 188. 
Significantly, Appellants' Joinder stated, "Plaintiffs ("Miller/Rzecycki") hereby 
joins (sic) in the State of Utah ("SITLA") Rule 54(b) Motion to ModifV March 3, 
2005 Order and Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaints. 
SITLAfs adoption of Rule 850-80-250 and its procedures for due process notice 
and extinguishment of temporary easements. R. 213-15, 192-194, 196, 204, 206-
09. Accordingly, the trial court had no basis to depart from finding (2), the 
existing law of the case. 
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Miller/Rzecycki hereby adopts Points, I, II, and HI of the Memoradum filed by 
SITLA in support of its motion." (Emphasis added.) 
16. On November 28, 2005 SITLA served on Appellees SITLA's Third 
Party State of Utah's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay Defendants' 
Response to SITLA's Motion to Dismiss and Third Party Complaint and Joint 
Motion to Modify Order. R. 48, 222-24. Therein SITLA stated, SITLA "has no 
objection to Defendants' Motion to Stay," and, "The State takes no position as to 
wisdom of the Defendants1 proposed changes to the March 3, 2005 order ..." R. 
223. 
17. On December 13, 2005 Appellees filed Appellees' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay Defendants' 
Response to SITLA's Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint and Joint Motion 
to Modify Order. 48, 225-249. This memorandum argued that the trial court 
should modify the March 3 Order as moved in Appellees' Joint Stay Motion, since 
Appellants were estopped to deny the relief (having repeatedly insisted that SITLA 
could not grant a permanent easement), and, additionally, because Appellants 
themselves had unconditionally moved for such relief in their joinder to SITLA's 
motion. R. 230-33, 188. 
18. On December 13, 2005 Appellees also filed Defendants' Joint 
Memorandum in Response to State of Utah's Motion to Modify March 3, 2005 
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Order, which reiterated Appellees' positions in their Joint Motion. R. 48, 178-87. 
On January 24, 2006 the trial court considered the pending motions and heard oral 
argument. R. 48-49. SITLA advised the trial court that it "has no objection to the 
[Appellees'] motion to amend/modify [the March 3 Order]." R. 49. Appellees had 
previously submitted a proposed Order Modifying March 3, 2005 Order and 
Dismissing Defendants' Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaints, 
which the trial court would ultimately sign. R. 49, 254-57. The trial court granted 
Appellants three weeks to file an objection to the proposed order. R. 49. 
19. On February 14, 2006 Appellants filed their one paragraph objection. 
R. 49, 257-58. On February 21, 2006 Appellees filed their joint response. R. 49, 
260-65. On March 22, 2006, the trial court issued its ruling. R. 49, 250-52. Also 
on March 22, 2006 the trial court signed the Order Modifying March 3y 2005 
Order and Dismissing Defendants' Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-Party 
Complaint. R. 254-57. The March 22, 2006 order stated as follows: 
The Court having considered the State of Utah's 
("SITLA") Rule 54(b) Motion to Modify the March 3, 2005 
Order and the Joint Motion to Modify Order of Defendants 
Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. (ffRR4W") and San Juan County 
("the County"), collectively called "Defendants," and finding 
good cause to grant same, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Court's March 3, 2005 Order ("the Order") is 
modified as follows: 
A. Paragraphs 1 and 2 and 2.A. remain the same 
without modification. 
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B. Existing paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. of the Order are 
hereby stricken. 
C. A new Paragraph 2.B. is inserted into the Order to 
state, 
B. Plaintiffs acquired the property subject to the 
temporary easement. The temporary easement exists until 
a permanent easement is established under Section 72-5-
203(2). Under Plaintiffs and SITLA's position no 
permanent easement can be granted (unless the property 
reverts to SITLA). This means that the temporary 
easement is of indefinite duration. Only if Plaintiffs were 
to forfeit under the certificate of sale or if SITLA were to 
otherwise resume all equitable as well as legal title would 
RR4W and the County potentially be able to apply for a 
permanent easement." 
D. A new Paragraph 2.C. is inserted into the Order to 
state, 
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, 
except in this action, shall have no affect of legal or 
factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other 
issue preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity 
with them, or on any other persons or actions. 
2. That Defendants1 Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-
Party Complaints are dismissed. Such dismissal does not 
preclude Defendants from asserting their rights to permanent 
easements if Plaintiff s property reverts or returns to SITLA. 
In its ruling the trial court stated that the March 22, 2006 order was "the best 
language available to describe the present application of the law to the facts in this 
case." (R. 252; emphasis added.) 
20. On April 6, 2006 Appellants filed their second premature notice of 
appeal although the trial court had not yet ruled upon all causes of action in 
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Appellants' amended complaint and in Appellees' counterclaims. R. 49; Court of 
Appeals appeal no. 20060331-CA. This second appeal was dismissed upon 
Appellees' motion for summary disposition and remanded by Memorandum 
Decision Court of Appeals order filed with the trial court on May 31, 2006. R. 50. 
21. The parties then filed a stipulation to dismiss without prejudice 
Appellants' and Appellees' remaining causes of action and the trial court entered 
an Order Dismissing Remaining Claims Without Prejudice on June 19, 2006. R. 
50, 266-67. Appellants then filed their third improper appeal (Court of Appeals 
appeal no. 20060721-CA); this time late-filing their notice of appeal on July 31, 
2006. R. 50. Having missed the final date to file an appeal, Appellants on August 
17, 2006 filed a motion for the trial court to extend the time to appeal. R. 50, 268-
98. 
23. Appellees objected to Appellants' requested extension of time. R. 
51-51, 299-303. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to extend the time for 
appeal by order dated September 22, 2006. R. 51, 304-08. Appellants did not 
appeal the trial court's denial of Appellants' motion to extend the time for filing an 
appeal, thus bringing the First Action to a close. 
Second Action 
24. Appellants commenced this Second Action by filing their complaint 
herein April 5, 2007. R. 3-9, 309-315. 
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25. Appellants concede that this Second Action has the same parties and 
the same claims as adjudicated in the First Action. Appellants' Br. at 6. 
25. Appellees moved, inter alia, to dismiss the Second Action on the 
ground that the Second Action was barred by res judicata. R. 10-317, 328-333. 
The trial court dismissed the Second Action as barred by res judicata. R. 337-340. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The First Action's March 22, 2006 order is clear on its face. 
Paragraph 2.C. of the order clearly states that the trial court's ruling applies to the 
claims decided in the First Action and that res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
other issue preclusion apply to the claims decided in the First Action, as "this 
action" is expressly excepted from the non-application of issue preclusion to other 
actions. Only as to claims not ruled upon in the First Action would res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and other issue preclusion not apply. 
2. The record fully supports the clear meaning of paragraph 2.C. of the 
March 22, 2006 order. 
3. Appellants' Second Action involves the same parties and the same 
claims that were finally disposed by the March 22, 2006 and June 19, 2006 orders 
in the First Action. Therefore, the Second Action was barred by res judicata and 
the Second Action was properly dismissed with prejudice. 
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4. Appellants' complaint in the Second Action, by failing to assert 
claims against SITLA, was fiitile and therefore properly dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Appellants' complaint in the Second Action, by failing to assert 
claims against SITLA, while nominally naming SITLA, was filed in bad faith and 
therefore properly dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Appellants' Complaint Was Properly Dismissed because Appellants' 
Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata.4 
A. Introduction. 
This is an appeal from the Second Action Appellants have filed regarding 
the Strike Ravine Trail road, which intersects real property Appellants are 
purchasing from the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
("SITLA"). Previously, over two and one-half years in the First Action, the trial 
court finally adjudicated Appellants' claims regarding the Strike Ravine Trail in 
the First Action, case number 040700037. The First Action involved Appellants 
filing two premature, dismissed appeals that delayed the case. The First Action 
also involved Appellants belatedly filing a third appeal after the expiration of the 
30 day time period, unsuccessfully moving the trial court to extend the time for 
4
 This point rebuts Appellants' second argument. Appellants' Br. 8-10. 
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appeal, and then failing to file any appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellants' 
motion to extend the time for appeal.5 
Having failed to appeal the Court's final judgment in the First Action, 
Appellants filed the Second Action. Appellants concede that the Second Action 
"involves the same parties and the same claims as" the First Action. Appellants' 
Br. at 6. Without providing any relevant background or context to the Court, 
Appellants assert that they may de novo re-litigate the matters resolved in the First 
Action, thereby burdening Appellees and the judicial system with years more of 
litigation. Appellants' assertion is based on language in the First Action's March 
22, 2006 order that states: 
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, 
except in this action, shall have no affect of legal or 
factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other 
issue preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity 
with them, or on any other persons or actions. 
The trial court in the Second Action properly rejected Appellant's attempt 
to misconstrue the trial court's order in the First Action. R. 337-40. The trial 
court correctly ruled that the order language did not authorize de novo litigation of 
the case, stating, "Paragraph 2.C. is most reasonably interpreted to eliminate any 
5
 A true copy of the First Action's docket is found at R. 37-51. Record citations to 
these events are set forth in Appellee's statement of the case, supra. 
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"issue preclusion" effects of the order in any other dispute involving SITLA, 
RR4W, the County or Plaintiffs." R. 339-40. 
In its March 22, 2006 ruling in the First Action the trial court had noted that 
the language was "the best language available to describe the present application 
of the law to the facts in this case" (R. 252), given the "most puzzling scenario" 
(R. 250), that had occurred in the First Action. Appellees in sub-point C will 
explain the First Action's puzzling procedural scenario, something that was 
Appellant's duty in marshaling the facts for its appeal, but which Appellants have 
utterly failed to do. Initially, however, Appellees show that the order is clear on its 
face and thereby bars Appellants from re-litigating the First Action. R. 339-40. 
B. The March 22, 2006 Order Is Clear on Its Face. 
Paragraph 2.C. of the March 22, 2006 order clearly states that the trial 
court's ruling applies to the claims decided in the First Action and that res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and other issue preclusion apply to the claims decided in the 
First Action, since "this action" is expressly excepted from the non-application of 
issue preclusion to other actions. Only as to claims not ruled upon in the First 
Action would res judicata, collateral estoppel and other issue preclusion not apply. 
In its ruling in the Second Action the trial court correctly stated, "Paragraph 2.C. is 
most reasonably interpreted to eliminate any "issue preclusion" effects of the order 
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in any other dispute involving SITLA, RR4W, the County or Plaintiffs." R. 339-
40. 
As discussed below the parties had litigated only claims specifically related 
to the Strike Ravine Trail and the ruling's res judicata effect was to be limited to 
these claims. The ruling would not apply to any other routes that may have been 
affected by sales of land by SITLA where SITLA may have similarly failed to give 
RR4 W and the County due process notice and opportunity to protect their 
easement rights. The language is straightforward and Appellants cannot 
unilaterally endow the order with an absurd meaning. Cf. Buehner Block 
Company v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895(Utah 1988): "[T]erms are not 
necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a 
different meaning than that relied upon by the drafter." 
C. The Record Shows Appellants9 Construction of the Order to 
Be Untenable. 
Appellants undertook to purchase 160 acres from SITLA under a certificate 
of sale. R. 64. The 160 acres were within a school section granted to the State at 
statehood. Roads, including a route known as the Strike Ravine Trail, passed 
through and over portions of the 160 acres. Around the school section adjoining 
lands are held by the United States Bureau of Land Management. Rights-of-way 
by prescription could be created over the adjoining BLM lands pursuant to federal 
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law R.S. 2477. However, it is unclear whether public or private rights-of-way by 
prescription may be obtained over Utah sovereign lands absent express statutory 
authority. The Utah legislature addressed the issue by in 1992 enacting the 
"Rights-of-Way Across State Lands" act, Utah Code § 72-5-201, et seq. The act 
authorizes "temporary easements" and "permanent easements" over State trust 
lands. The provision regarding temporary easements, Utah Code § 72-5-203(1), 
states: 
(1) (a) (i) Subject to Section 53C-1-302 and Subsection 53C-1-204(1), a 
temporary public easement or right of entry is granted for each highway 
existing prior to January 1, 1992, that terminates at or within or traverses 
any state lands and that has been constructed and maintained or used by a 
responsible authority. 
(b) Each easement shall remain in effect through June 30, 2004, or 
until a permanent easement or right of entry has been established under 
Subsection (2), whichever is greater. 
Temporary easements under the statute, thus, are by express grant, with the 
condition of such grant being only that the highway existed prior to January 1, 
1992, traverses state lands and has been constructed, maintained, or used by a 
responsible authority.6 
6
 "'Responsible authority9 means any private party, the state of Utah, or a political 
subdivision of the state ..." Utah Code § 72-5-202. 
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RR4W and its members had used the Strike Ravine Trail prior to January 1, 
1992 as had San Juan County and its citizens. On the eve of the 2004 Jeep Safari, 
Appellants filed the First Action against Appellees claiming that Appellants' 
purchase of the 160 acres had extinguished any rights in existing roads on the 
property. Appellants moved the trial court to enjoin RR4W's use of the Strike 
Ravine Trail during the Jeep Safari. The trial court denied the injunction, finding, 
inter alia, that SITLA had not used due process notice or procedures necessary to 
extinguish temporary easements.7 This due process ruling was the trial court's 
continuing law of the case and therewith meant that SITLA had retained the right 
7
 R. 213-15. Due process requires that before a forfeiture may occur notice must 
be given by a method "reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections." Dusenberyv. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 
168-69 (2002), citing and affirming Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Since SITLA never gave any notice reasonably 
calculated to apprise Appellees that their temporary easements were subject to 
forfeiture and never gave Appellees an opportunity to preserve their rights, there 
could be no lawful forfeiture. Appellees' temporary easements remained on the 
property after SITLA's sale to Appellants. Conversely, the involved statute and 
existing road put Appellants on inquiry notice that the Strike Ravine trail was a 
temporary easement. Inquiry notice "is presumed because of the fact that a person 
has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, 
knowledge of the ultimate fact.1" First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 
P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998) (quoting 66 C.J.S. Notice § 6 (1950)). SITLA 
subsequently adopted Rule 850-80 to address this obvious due process deficiency. 
R. 216-218. Rule 850-80-250 sets forth specific due process requirements that 
SITLA must adhere to before it may extinguish temporary easements as part of any 
conveyance of SITLA lands; requirements that were not followed regarding the 
Strike Ravine Trail. R. 193-94 
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and duty to grant permanent easements to Appellees under Utah Code § 72-5-
203(1). 
After considering cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the trial 
court ruled on March 3, 2005 that under § 72-5-203(1) RR4W and the County both 
owned temporary easements over the Strike Ravine Trail over Appellants' 
property. R. 112; paragraph 2.A. 
Throughout the First Action litigation Appellants contended that Appellees 
could never receive a permanent easement under Utah Code § 72-5-203(2), 
asserting that Defendant's right to a permanent easement was lost when SITLA 
sold the property to Appellants without expressly reserving the Strike Ravine Trail. 
The trial court rejected this argument as reflected by paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. of 
its March 3, 2005 ruling: 
B. The temporary easement exists until a permanent easement 
is established under Section 72-5-203(2), Utah Code. The parties 
concede that fair market value for a permanent easement must be 
paid. Because the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration ("SITLA") is not a party to this case, the court cannot 
determine at this time whether compensation for the easement should 
be paid to SITLA or plaintiffs. The court also cannot determine 
whether SITLA or plaintiffs has standing to dispute the value placed 
on the permanent easement or make the determination referred to in 
Section 72-5-203(2)(c), Utah Code. 
C. This court does not believe that defendants can postpone 
indefinitely petitioning for establishment of the permanent easement. The 
Court encourages the parties, in cooperation with SITLA, to agree upon a 
timetable for establishing the permanent easement and determining the fair 
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value thereof. In the absence of agreement, the court will intervene to set 
deadlines and mechanisms for resolving this matter at the invitation of any 
party. 
R. 112-13. 
SITLA, contrary to the trial court's position, took the position that it could 
not grant a permanent easement once it had sold the property to Appellants. R. 
126. As a result Appellees moved to join SITLA to the action to compel SITLA to 
grant permanent easements to Appellees. R. 46, 115. The Court ordered SITLA 
joined as a third party defendant and SITLA was duly served with process. 
To extricate itself from the case, SITLA immediately moved the trial court 
to modify the March 3, 2005 order. R. 149. In Point II of its memorandum SITLA 
moved the trial court to amend its March 3 2005 Order to "find that the 'temporary1 
easement encumbered the property as an existing right, and that the same continues 
to exist indefinitely so long as the property does not revert to the State."8 R. 162. 
Appellants filed a joinder that expressly joined in SITLA's memorandum point II 
even though such joinder eliminated any mechanism for the trial court to make 
Appellants whole.9 Appellees filed a motion and memorandum accepting SITLA's 
8&>eNote3. 
9
 The trial court's March 22, 2006 ruling stated, 'The Court invited the inclusion of 
SITLA ... because SITLA could be the agency [to which Appellees could apply 
and pay for a permanent easement]. ... The Court was also concerned that SITLA 
might have some responsibility to the Owners ... At the latest hearing, the Owners 
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"indefinite duration temporary easement" offer and moved the trial court to amend 
the order accordingly. Faced with unanimous stipulation of the parties the trial 
court amended its March 3, 2005 order (R. 111) by its order dated March 22, 2007 
(R. 254) to provide that Appellees' temporary easements would remain indefinitely 
until the property might revert to SITLA. 
It was in the process of carefully stipulating to SITLA's proposed 
modification of the March 3, 2005 order that Appellees proposed the substitute 
paragraph 2.B. and paragraph 2.C. language that came to be in the Court's March 
22, 2006 order. Appellees, for purposes of the Strike Ravine Trail over 
Appellants' property only, accepted SITLA's and Appellants' position that SITLA 
could not grant a permanent easement — even though this was contrary to the trial 
court's due process/permanent easement law of the case. Appellees so stipulated 
because: 1) Appellees' temporary easements in the current action would continue 
indefinitely until SITLA might at some time reacquire the property, and, if SITLA 
were to reacquire the property, Defendant's temporary easements would then be 
subject to conversion to permanent easements under the statute;10 and, 2) in any 
other dispute involving property sold by SITLA without due process to Appellees, 
made it clear that they do not intend to participate with the County and Red Rock 
in a process to determine the value of a permanent easement..." 
R.251. 
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Appellees would not be bound by collateral estoppel from again arguing lack of 
due process and that SITLA remains able to grant a permanent easement where it 
has not extinguished a temporary easement through due process notice and 
procedures.11 
In their joint memorandum Appellees explained the need for the Paragraph 
2.C. language that Appellants now misconstrue. Appellees stated: 
Plaintiffs and third party defendant SITLA have both 
asserted the position that it is impossible for Defendants to 
obtain a permanent easement from SITLA after sale of the 
property under a Certificate of Sale ("the Position").12 [note 1 in 
original] 
The Position assumes that Defendants cannot, under any 
circumstances, obtain a permanent easement where the property 
has already been sold under certificate because SITLA's 
Certificate of Sale "conveyed all relevant executory rights" and 
SITLA retained "only bare legal title" with no "right or ability to 
convey a permanent easement." SITLA Mem. at 6-8. 
10
 Paragraph l.C. of March 22, 2006 order amending paragraph 2.B. of March 3, 
2005 order and paragraph 2 of March 22, 2006 order. R. 254. 
11
 Paragraph l.D. of March 22, 2006 order amending paragraph 2.C. of March 3, 
2005 order. R. 254. 
[Note 1] Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Order, dated February 
14, 2005, at page 2,"... it is plaintiffs' contention that [Defendants'] 
opportunity [to obtain a permanent right-of-way] passed with the sale 
of the property ..." SITLA's Memorandum in Support of (I) Rule 
54(b) Motion to Modify March 3, 2005 Order and (2) Rule 12(b) 
Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaints of Red Rock 4-
Wheeler's, Inc. and San Juan County, at page 10, "SITLA cannot 
grant a permanent easement because it has nothing left to grant." 
RR4W's Supplemental Complaint and Third Party Complaint alleges 
at paragraphs 6 and 19 that SITLA has taken this position 
27 
Accordingly, under the Position, SITLA has no discretion to 
consider whether to grant a non-existent permanent easement. 
Defendants, while not agreeing with the Position, and 
believing that the Court also holds a contrary view of the law, is 
willing to accept the Position for purposes of this litigation only 
so long as acceptance of the Position carries with it necessary 
amendments of the Order and with Plaintiffs and SITLA bearing 
the necessary consequences of the Position. 
The Position necessarily means that neither SITLA nor 
Plaintiffs claim the right to be paid for a permanent easement, 
since both SITLA and Plaintiffs contend that there is, or can be, 
no permanent easement. Therefore, under the Position, 
paragraph 2.B. of the Order is not necessary. 
The Position further necessarily means that SITLA and 
Plaintiffs are permanently estopped to contend that Defendants 
must apply for permanent easements, since under the Position 
there could not exist permanent easements for which Defendants 
might apply. Therefore, under the Position, paragraph 2.C. of 
the Order is not necessary. 
As the result of the Position paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. of 
the Order should be stricken. A new Paragraph 2.B. should be 
inserted to state, 
B. Plaintiffs acquired the property subject to the 
temporary easement. The temporary easement exists until a 
permanent easement is established under Section 72-5-203(2). 
Under Plaintiffs and SITLA's position no permanent 
easement can be granted (unless the property reverts to 
SITLA). This means that the temporary easement is of 
indefinite duration. Only if Plaintiffs were to forfeit under the 
certificate of sale or if SITLA were to otherwise resume all 
equitable as well as legal title would RR4W and the County 
potentially be able to apply for a permanent easement." 
It must be understood that this ruling would only apply to 
this action and would not serve as precedent. A new Paragraph 
2.C. should be inserted to state, 
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, except in 
this action, shall have no affect of legal or factual precedent, 
res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion on 
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the parties hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other 
persons or actions. 
Having assumed the Position, SITLA and Plaintiffs 
cannot object to this result. ... 
R. 183-185, underlined emphases added. The above discussion and particularly 
the highlighted language explains how and why the involved language came to be 
included in the trial court's order of March 22, 2006, which amended the March 3, 
2005 order. Noting the "puzzling scenario" before it, the trial court in the First 
Action signed the proposed order submitted by Appellees as "the best language 
available to describe the present application of the law to the facts in this case." R. 
250-51. 
In its ruling dismissing the Second Action the trial court stated, The Court 
correctly stated: 
Paragraph 2.C. is most reasonably interpreted to eliminate any "issue 
preclusion" effects of the order in any other dispute involving SITLA, 
RR4W, the County or Plaintiffs. Because of the peculiar and puzzling 
nature of this dispute the parties were understandably concerned about the 
effect of the Order on any other disputes that might arise. However, they 
clearly intended that the order have "claim preclusion" in "this action," 
namely Civil No. 0407-27 (sic). To read paragraph 2.C. as Plaintiffs 
advocate would mean that the Order had no effect in resolving the claims 
presented in Civil No. 0407-37." 
R. 339. The trial court emphasized, "This court certainly intended its [First 
Action] decision, reached only after several hearings, and mind-bending analysis 
of the pertinent statutes, would operate as an adjudication on the merits, and finally 
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resolve this dispute between the parties." R. 339. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly dismissed the Second Action. 
D. The Court's Final Order in the First Action Bars 
Appellants' Claims as Res Judicata. 
Appellants acknowledge that the Second Action involved the same parties 
and the same claims that were finally adjudicated in the First Action. Appellants' 
Br. 6. Therefore, Appellants' Second Action was barred by Res Judicata. The 
Supreme Court addressed res judicata in Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 
13; 73 P.3d 325, 332, stating: 
f33 "The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing 
previously litigated issues from being relitigated.1 Res judicata encompasses 
two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.11 See Miller v. 
USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 57, 44 P.3d 663 (quoting Salt Lake City 
v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995), and citing 
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 19, 16 P.3d 1214). 
^34 "Generally, 'claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a 
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously.1" Miller, 
2002 UT 6 at f 58 (quoting Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 
108, TI13, 44 P.3d 642). In order for a claim to be precluded under this 
doctrine the party seeking preclusion must establish three elements: 
"First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." 
Miller, 2002 UT 6 at ^ 58 (quoting Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93 at \ 20) 
(further citation omitted). 
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All three elements for claim preclusion are present in this action. The 
parties and claims in the Second Action are the same as in the First Action. The 
First Action resulted in a final adjudication of the Strike Ravine Trail issues as 
intended by the parties and the trial court. R. 266-67, 339. Appellants failed to 
timely appeal that final adjudication and failed to appeal the trial court's denial of 
Appellants' motion to extend the time for filing an appeal. R. 268-308. 
Appellants cannot again litigate the same claims. 
II. Appellants' First Argument Is a Red Herring. The March 22, 2006 
Order Was Not Final on March 22, 2006 and Resulted from 
Stipulation of the Parties, Not from a Summary Judgment. 
Appellants' first argument, Appellants' Br. 7-8, ignores the procedural 
history of the First Action. When the trial court signed the March 22, 2006 order 
modifying the March 3, 2005 order, the First Action was not yet final as there 
remained claims and counterclaims unresolved by the trial court. These remaining 
claims included the first cause of action of Appellants' amended complaint 
(regarding the Helldorado Trail) and the second and third causes of action of 
RR4W's and the County's counterclaims. In fact, Appellants second premature 
appeal, which followed entry of the March 22, 2006 order, was dismissed because 
the trial court's dispositive Strike Ravine Trail orders (the March 3, 2005 order as 
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modified by the March 22, 2006 order) were not final so long as unresolved claims 
were pending.13 R. 49-50. 
Appellants and Appellees stipulated, and the trial court ordered, by order 
entered June 19, 2006, that the remaining claims and counterclaims were dismissed 
without prejudice. R. 266-67. Pursuant to such order the March 22, 2006 order, 
effective June 19, 2007, became final with prejudice. Appellants so understood 
since 1) it was necessary for Appellants to have the trial court's March 22, 2006 
order become final in order for the Strike Ravine Trail claim to be ripe for appeal, 
and 2) Appellants filed a notice of appeal on July 31, 2006 (R. 50), something they 
would not have done had they not considered themselves bound by the trial court's 
Strike Ravine Trail orders. 
Further, the March 22, 2006 order did not result from a summary judgment 
ruling (as had the March 3, 2005 order). Rather, the March 22, 2006 order resulted 
from the parties' stipulation that the March 3, 2005 order would be modified and 
that SITLA would be dismissed as a party. R. 47-48, 148-189, 219-252. 
Appellants, without condition, joined in SITLA's motion to modify the March 3, 
2005 order, and stipulated to SITLA's dismissal from the First Action 
necessitating the trial court's rulings. R. 48, 188. Appellants' argument is simply 
13
 See this Court's May 25, 2006 Memorandum Decision dismissing Appeal No. 
20060331-CA. 
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an unfounded collateral attack in lieu of their failure to timely file an appeal in the 
First Action. 
III. Appellants' Third Argument Was Not Presented to the Trial Court 
and Has No Basis under Utah law. 
Appellees object to Appellants' third ("equitable exception") argument, 
Appellants' Br. 10-11, as this argument was not presented to the trial court and 
thus was not preserved for consideration in this appeal. Tschaggeny v. Millbank 
Insurance Company, 2007 UT 37, 163 P.3d 615, 620. Without waiving their 
objection Appellees respond as follows. 
Appellants invited the trial court's rulings in the First Action, joining in 
SITLA's motion to amend the March 3, 2005 order. Appellants declined the trial 
court's affordance of a remedy involving SITLA and stipulated to SITLA's 
dismissal. Appellants received just what they asked for before they failed to timely 
appeal the March 22, 2006 order and failed to appeal the trial court's denial of an 
extension of time to file an appeal. This scenario would not present an equitable 
foundation for avoidance of the doctrine of res judicata, if, arguendo, there were 
such a doctrine in Utah. Appellant's naming SITLA a party in the Second Action 
while yet again asking no relief against SITLA likewise cuts hard against any plea 
to equity.14 
14
 Discussed in following points. 
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Appellants cite no case remotely similar to this case where equity has 
overridden res judicata. The court in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 
U.S. 394 (1981) upheld the application of res judicata. American Estate 
Management Corporation v. International Investment and Development 
Corporation, 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765, likewise strongly enforced res 
judicata, even as to issues not actually litigated, but which should have been 
litigated. In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) addressed family law 
matters involving the protection of children. Even here the Court found that res 
judicata did not apply due to differing claims, not that res judicata regarding the 
same claims could be equitably avoided. Appellants have not shown that Utah 
courts have ever adopted an equitable exception to the application of res judicata. 
To accept Appellants' argument would shake the foundations of res judicata, 
leaving no final judgment free from "equitable" attack. 
IV. Appellants' Second Action Complaint Was Futile on Its Face, 
Providing an Alternative Basis to Uphold the Trial Court's Dismissal 
of the Second Action with Prejudice. 
Appellants' Second Action complaint, although naming SITLA as a 
defendant in the caption, conspicuously stated no claims against SITLA and 
requested no relief against SITLA. Thus, Appellants' posturing of the Second 
Action was the same as Appellants' posturing where the First Action bottle-
necked. During the First Action Appellants (against the trial court's opportunity to 
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do so) refused to request any relief regarding SITLA, joined in SITLA's motion to 
modify the March 3, 2005 Order, and stipulated to SITLA's dismissal. This 
occurred after Appellants complained about the indeterminate length of Appellees' 
temporary easements in their Objection to Proposed Order dated February 17, 
2005 (R. 45), after the Court stated that it would provide a remedy (paragraphs 
2.B. and 2.C. of March 3, 2005 order), and after Appellees had caused SITLA to 
be joined as parties in the First Action in order to resolve permanent easement and 
compensation issues. Without seeking definitive relief regarding SITLA in the 
Second Action, Appellants again involved Appellees in a lawsuit that could never 
result in any meaningful relief. In other words Appellants again brought a futile 
proceeding before the trial court. R. 33-34. 
This situation compares to denials of leave to amend to state a claim that is 
futile. A party may not amend a complaint to add a claim that is legally 
insufficient or futile. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expedition Company, 2003 UT 57, 
84 P.3d 1154, 1162-63 (Utah 2003). "[L]eave to file an amendment should be 
denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally 
insufficient or futile. See Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 
(Utah 1992); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 
Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (Idaho 1991). Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, 
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871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994). Appellants' refusal to seek non-futile 
relief requires that their Second Action complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 
V. Appellants' Second Action Complaint's Deception Provides an 
Alternative Basis to Uphold the Trial Court's Dismissal of the 
Second Action with Prejudice. 
By including SITLA in the Second Action complaint caption while not 
stating any claims against SITLA, Appellants attempted to "pull a fast one" on the 
trial court and Appellees, creating the illusion that Appellants were seeking 
meaningful relief necessarily involving SITLA where, in fact, they were not. R. 
33-34. Comparison again may be made to amendment cases. In Forman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962), the United States Supreme Court stated: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue 
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, 
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as 
the rules require, be "freely given." 
Emphases added. Appellants herein have acted in bad faith and with dilatory 
motive in filing their slight-of-hand pleading that could lead to no meaningful 
relief. This provides a further basis to dismiss Appellants' Second Action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Second Action was barred under res 
judicata. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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Dated this 15 day of P^eg^c^TSXH. 
HANKS & MORTENSEN, PC. 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent Red 
Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. 
Mt 
WALTER! 
Deputy San Juan County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent San Juan 
County 
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The undersigned certifies that on the (3 day of fs^j^s:/^\ , 2007 
he caused two copies of the foregoing Joint Brief of Respondents to be served by 
depositing same in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid addressed as 
follows: 
Bruce R. Baird 
Hutchings Baird Curtis & Astill, P.L.L.C. 
9537 South 700 East 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
675 East 500 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 (courtesy copy-not party to appeal) 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
Selected Written Orders from the First Action 
Index 
Date Order Addendum Page 
April 19,2004 Order Denying Motion for 1 
Preliminary Injunction 
March 3, 2005 Order (re summary judgment 
motions, entered March 8, 2005) 6 
March 22, 2006 Ruling (re March 22, 2006 order) 10 
March 22, 2006 Order Modifying March 3, 2005 14 
Order and Dismissing Defendants' 
Supplemental Counterclaims and 
Third-Party Complaints 
Sept. 25, 2006 Order (denying Plaintiffs' motion 
to extend deadline for filing appeal) 17 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
F,LED
 APR 1 9 2004 
Paul W. Mortensen 
Attorney for Defendants 
Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. 
P. 0. Box 1294 
Centeville, Utah 84014 
Phone/Fax: (801) 292-7059 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH 
KILEY MILLER & JOHN 
RZECZYCKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED ROCK 
4-WHEELERS, INC., and JOHN 
and JANE DOES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 040700037 
Judge: Anderson 
The above action came before the Court for hearing on the 2nd day of April, 2004, 
pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs appeared personally 
and by their counsel, Steve Russell. Defendant Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. ("RR4W) 
appeared personally through its officers Doug McElhaney and Ber Knight and by its 
counsel Paul W. Mortensen. Walter J. Bird appeared on behalf of Defendant San Juan 
County. 
The Court specifically considered Plaintiffs' request for the Court to enjoin 
defendants from using two routes that pass through Plaintiffs property; to wit: the Strike 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
DEPUTY 
Ravine trail and the Lower Helldorado Trail Plaintiffs presented evidence that they 
purchased their property from State Institutional and Trust Lands (SITLA), that motor 
vehicles have used the Strike Ravine and the Lower Helldorado, and that RR4W intended 
to use the Strike Ravine trail as an official trial during the 2004 Jeep Safari. 
With respect to the Strike Ravine trail, Defendant RR4W presented evidence that 
the trail has been used by members of the public from as early as the 1960's and 1970's, 
including testimony of personal use since the 1970's by Doug McElhaney, his 
encountering other motorists on the route, and a photograph showing evidence of 
bulldozer construction and hillside-cut of the trail at the northeast border of Plaintiff s 
property. Ber Knight of RR4W testified that RR4W had used the Strike Ravine trail as 
an official route in the 1991 Jeep Safari, as well as subsequent years, and had by 
motorized vehicles "scouted" the trail months previous to 1991. Based upon evidence of 
public use and RR4W use of the Strike Ravine trail, prior to January 1, 1992, the 
effective date of Rights-of-Way Across State Lands Act, Section 72-5-201, et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated, the Court found there was at least some evidence of public and RR4W 
use of the trail prior to January 1, 1992. Further considering the evidence, the Court 
found that Plaintiffs failed to show that they would suffer irreparable harm, that their 
harm exceeded potential harm to Defendants if relief were granted or that an injunction 
would not be contrary to the public interest. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to an 
injunction regarding the Strike Ravine trail. 
2 
With respect to the Lower Helldorado trail, both RR4W and San Juan County 
represented that they have no intention to use the trail during the 2004 Jeep Safari, or 
thereafter, unless and until there is evidence that the trail was used prior to January 1, 
1992. No evidence was produced at hearing to show that the trail had been used before 
January 1, 1992, but both defendants reserved to right to discover and present such 
evidence at subsequent hearing or trial on the merits. Given both defendants' lack of 
intention to use the Lower Helldorado trail, the Court found no need for an injunction to 
issue, and, accordingly, declined to issue an injunction. With regard to the general 
public, the Court indicated that it would be inclined to enjoin travel on the Lower 
Helldorado on Plaintiffs' properly, but would not do so in the absence of evidence of any 
member of the public who has stated any intent to use the trail. The Court stated that 
Plaintiffs could document vehicles or persons who may pass upon the Lower Helldorado 
trail and bring an action for trespass and related damages, if it is subsequently determined 
that there is no right-of-way through the Lower Helldorado on Plaintiffs Property. 
Based upon such rulings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for 
an injunction is DENIED.
 f 
Dated this /W^dayof fchJYl I 2004. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STEVE RUSSELL, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Walter J. Bird, Attorney for Defendant 
San Juan County 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040700037 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
PO BOX 12 94 
CENTERVILLE, UT 84014 
Dated this 1 A day of 
^6&<A~ 
Deputy -0ourt Clerk 
Page 1 ( last) 
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/ 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEPUTY 
KILEY MILLER and JOHN 
RZECZYCKI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED 
ROCK 4-WHEELERS, INC., and 
JOHN and JANE DOES, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
ORDER 
Case No.0407-37 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
This matter came before the court for hearing on January 31, 
2005. The court considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel 
and verbally announced its decision. Defendant Red Rock 4-Wheelers, 
Inc., submitted a proposed order to which plaintiffs object. The 
court has considered those objections and the responses thereto and 
has determined that judicial economy is best served by the court 
preparing its own order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Plaintiffs erroneously argue that persons who historically obtained 
a permit for the Jeep Safari cannot benefit from a public easement. 
There is at least a genuine issue of fact about whether the public 
006 
enjoys an easement to traverse plaintiff's property. Red Rock 4-
Wheelers, Inc., and members of the public participating in the Jeep 
Safari have no less right to traverse plaintiff's property than the 
general public. 
2. Defendant's motions for partial summary judgment are 
granted as follows: 
A. Uncontradicted evidence having been presented that the 
Strike Ravine trail had been constructed and maintained or used by 
a responsible authority and existed prior to January 1, 1992, the 
court determines that San Juan Count holds for the public, and Red 
Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc., holds for its own uses pursuant to Section 
72-5-201, Utah Code, a temporary public easement or right-of-way to 
use the Strike Ravine trail. All members of the public have the 
right to travel the Strike Ravine trail. This temporary public 
easement was not extinguished when the State of Utah sold the land 
across which the Strike Ravine trail passes to the plaintiffs. The 
purpose a member of the public has in traveling the Strike Ravine 
trail is irrelevant. 
B. The temporary easement exists until a permanent easement is 
established under Section 72-5-203(2), Utah Code. The parties 
concede that fair market value for a permanent easement must be 
paid. Because the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
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Administration ("SITLA") is not a party to this case, the court 
cannot determine at this time whether compensation for the easement 
should be paid to SITLA or plaintiffs. The court also cannot 
determine whether SITLA or plaintiffs has standing to dispute the 
value placed on the permanent easement or make the determination 
referred to in Section 72-5-203(2) (c) , Utah Code. 
C. This court does not believe that defendants can postpone 
indefinitely petitioning for establishment of the permanent 
easement. The court encourages the parties, in cooperation with 
SITLA, to agree on a timetable for establishing the permanent 
easement and determining the fair value thereof. In the absence of 
agreement, the court will intervene to set deadlines and mechanisms 
for resolving this matter at the invitation of any party. 
DATED this &Z\ day of March, 2005. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, hand delivered, or faxed, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, this o —"day of 
March, 2005, to the following: 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Walter J. Bird 
Deputy San Juan County Attorney 
Po Box 9 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Paul W. Mortensen 
Hanks & Associates 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 740 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ V T U I J A U A A . ^ / ^ 
Deputy Coiwrt C l e r k 
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CLERK Cf THE COURT 
BY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KILEY MILLER and JOHN 
RZECZYCKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED 
ROCK 4-WHEELERS, INC., and 
JOHN and JANE DOES, 
Defendants, 
vs. | 
STATE of UTAH, by and through 
the SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 1 
RULING 
Case No.0407-37 
Defendants San Juan County (the "County") and Red Rock 4-
Wheelers, Inc. ("Red Rock") submitted a proposed order which 
plaintiffs Kiley Miller and John Rzeczycki (the "Owners") have 
objected. Third-party defendant School and Institutional Trust Land 
Administration ("SITLA") has previously secured the court's 
signature on an order dismissing it from this action. 
This case presents the court with perhaps the most puzzling 
scenario it has ever encountered. The "puzzlement" stems from the 
language of the operative statute, Section 72-5-203, Utah Code. The 
010 
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positions taken by the parties have not reduced the complexity of 
the issues. The court invited the inclusion of SITLA in this case 
because of the possibility that SITLA could be the agency to which 
the County or Red Rock should apply for a permanent easement, and 
to which they should make payment for that easement. The court was 
also concerned that SITLA might have some obligation to the Owners 
for having sold them property subject to an unrecorded easement. 
SITLA has expressed the view that the sale documents with the 
Owners protect it from any such claim and the Owners did not 
dispute that. SITLA adamantly declares that it would have no right 
to grant a permanent easement until and unless the property reverts 
to it because of failure of the Owners to fulfill their contract to 
pay for the property. The County and Red Rock did not dispute this. 
The court accordingly agreed to dismiss SITLA. 
At the latest hearing, the Owners made it clear that they do 
not intend to participate with the County and Red Rock in a process 
to determine the value of a permanent easement that is anything 
like the process that would have been followed by the County or Red 
Rock and SITLA before the sale. The court is at a loss to determine 
how to force participation by private owners in a process created 
for public owners of land. Moreover, the court is unsure how to 
apply the statutory standard of "a public benefit commensurate with 
Oil 
the value of the permanent easement or right of entry." Section 72-
5-203(2) (b), Utah Code, to a private transaction. 
The court considered declaring that, whatever the County and 
Red Rock had before the sale from SITLA to the Owners, it was 
extinguished by the sale. However, since expressing the view that 
this case is a ntoss-up" the court has read again the language of 
Section 72-5-203. The legislature used clear language of conveyance 
when it "granted" a "temporary public easement." The statute 
further provides that this easement lasts until a permanent 
easement has been established. The court is not empowered to ignore 
clear statutory language of conveyance, particularly when no party 
has asserted a claim that the legislature lacked authority to act 
as it did. 
The court has signed the proposed order submitted by the 
County and Red Rock as the best language available to describe the 
present application of the law to the facts of this case. 
DATED this Cl^cMay of March, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, hand delivered, or faxed, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling, this Lu^ day of 
March, 2 006, to the following: 
Bruce Baird 
Hutchings Baird & Jones, P.L.L.C. 
9537 South 600 East 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Michell E. McConkie 
State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Paul W. Mortensen 
Hanks & Mortensen, P.C 
8 East Broadway, Suite 740 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Walter J. Bird 
Deputy San Juan County Attorney 
PO Box 9 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Deputy Court Cler£/ 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH 
KILEY MILLER & JOHN 
RZECZYCKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED ROCK 
4-WHEELERS, INC., and JOHN 
and JANE DOES, 
Defendants. 
vs. 
STATE of UTAH, by and through the 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. | 
(Proposed) 
| ORDER MODIFYING MARCH 3, 
| 2005 ORDER AND DISMISSING 
! DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINTS 
Civil No. 0407-37 
Judge: Hon. Lyle R. Anderson 
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The Court having considered the State of Utahfs ("SITLA") Rule 54(b) Motion to 
Modify the March 3,2005 Order and the Joint Motion to Modify Order of Defendants 
Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. ("RR4W") and San Juan County ("the County"), collectively 
called "Defendants," and finding good cause to grant same, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
L That the Court's March 3,2005 Order ("the Order") is modified as follows: 
A. Paragraphs 1 and 2 and 2.A. remain the same without modification. 
B. Existing paragraphs 2.B. and 2.C. of the Order are hereby stricken. 
C. A new Paragraph 2.B. is inserted into the Order to state, 
B. Plaintiffs acquired the property subject to the temporary 
easement. The temporary easement exists until a permanent easement is 
established under Section 72-5-203(2). Under Plaintiffs and SITLA's 
position no permanent easement can be granted (unless the property 
reverts to SITLA). This means that the temporary easement is of 
indefinite duration. Only if Plaintiffs were to forfeit under the certificate 
of sale or if SITLA were to otherwise resume all equitable as well as legal 
title would RR4W and the County potentially be able to apply for a 
permanent easement." 
D. A new Paragraph 2.C. is inserted into the Order to state, 
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, except in this action, 
shall have no affect of legal or factual precedent, res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or other issue preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity 
with them, or on any other persons or actions. 
2. That Defendants1 Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-Party 
Complaints are dismissed. Such dismissal does not preclude Defendants from 
2 
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asserting their rights to permanent easements if Plaintiff s property reverts or 
returns to SITLA. 
Dated this 
3 
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San Juan County 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KILEY MILLER and JOHN 
RZECZYCKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED 
ROCK 4-WHEELERS, INC., and 
JOHN and JANE DOES, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
ORDER 
Case No.0407-37 
Plaintiffs have moved the court, pursuant to Rule 4(e), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to extend the deadline for filing a 
notice of appeal in this case. It is not disputed that the last day-
plaintiffs could file their notice of appeal was July 19, 2006. It 
is also not disputed that plaintiffs attempted to file their notice 
of appeal by mailing a copy of the notice of appeal on July 19, 
2006, to the Seventh Judicial District Court in Castle Dale, the 
site of the Seventh District Court of Emery County, or that the 
deputy clerks in Castle Dale received the notice of appeal on July 
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21, 2006. 
Were the question dispositive, the court would be inclined to 
determine that mailing the notice of appeal to the wrong seat of 
this court is the kind of neglect that should be excused. It is the 
kind of mistake that could be made by office staff unfamiliar with 
the geography of Utah and her political subdivisions. However, 
defendants point out in their memorandum opposing an extension that 
the notice of appeal would not have been timely filed even if it 
had been mailed to the right location for filing. Plaintiffs' only 
reply to this point is that it states the obvious. 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, this reply leaves the court 
without any explanation of why plaintiffs waited until July 19, 
2006, to see that a notice to appeal was filed and then chose a 
method of delivery that was certain to fail to meet the deadline. 
Without any explanation for waiting until the last day and then 
mailing instead of filing, the court is unable to determine that 
the failure to file was the result of excusable neglect. 
The court may also grant an extension for good cause. 
Plaintiffs argue that the court should grant their motion so this 
case can be appealed now. They claim that the language of paragraph 
2.C. inserted in the March 3, 2 005, order of this court deprives 
the court's decision in this case of any preclusive effect on any 
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future action plaintiffs or others may file. It therefore follows 
that judicial economy would be served by allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed with their appeal, which would lead to a decision that has 
at least precedential, if not preclusive, effect. 
This court certainly intended that its order finally resolve 
-at this level- the issue presented by the parties concerning the 
application of Section 72-5-203, Utah Code, to the facts of this 
case. Whether the language actually has the meaning plaintiffs 
ascribe to it is best resolved when that issue is squarely 
presented if and when plaintiffs assert their claims again. In 
fact, i£ paragraph 2.C. has the meaning plaintiffs assign, it is 
likely that this court has not succeeded in issuing a final, 
appealable order, and there is substantial risk that the appellate 
efforts of the parties during this round will be entirely wasted. 
The court has considered whether there is a public interest in 
advancing to an appellate level the puzzling issue created by the 
interaction of Section 72-5-203 with the past policy of State 
Institutional and Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") of not 
making any effort to determine the validity of Section 203 
easements before selling state lands. However, as far as this court 
knows, plaintiffs are the only buyers of state lands who have this 
kind of legal issue. According to representations of counsel for 
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SITLA, SITLA has taken steps to ensure that state lands are not, in 
the future, sold to buyers unaware of existing "temporary public 
easement[s]" of indefinite duration. This court is unable to 
determine that the issues in this case must be addressed by higher 
courts so that future buyers and sellers of state lands will know 
how to proceed. 
The motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal is 
denied. No further order of this court with respect to that motion 
is required. 
DATED this Ui]J day of September, 2006. 
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